and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning. 000

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes. 262 252

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice. 273

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and furrier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners. 32 28

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd Ic, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true. Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a

[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into
262 the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

*

When the cold east wind silently passes through
512 the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from
463 from the sheds. All the family clothing, the
286 underwear and linen for the house that is needed throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep
[53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

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648 Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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	Oilseeds	
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
388 Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

[p2 87]

TABLE XII (Continued)

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Animal fat

Production			74.7
Imports			12.5[1]
Available for consumption			
by urban population		32.7	
by rural population		54.5	
Total			87.2
Average consumption			Kilograms per person per year
by urban population			2.73
by rural population			2.0
Average			2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources		
Vegetable oils		105.8
Animal fats		74.7
Total production		180.5
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for distribution		193.0
Consumption		
Technical purposes		26.7
Food		
Urban	61.7	
Rural	104.6	
Total food		166.3
Total consumption		193.0
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		5.14
by rural population		3.86
Average		4.17

1 Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "...During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
649 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

U
433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables
231 per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force
[462] in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
9 cc of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

291 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand
73, tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary
648 relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopaedic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

731 Food Supplies

241 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data
433 were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945
●262 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed, fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

731 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the
262 Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but
648 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants. A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which foodstuffs reach the population:

(a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population. The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; prices are equally unstable.

000 day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all 434 the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for 441 example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

437 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,350 grams of fat.

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[1] A canned meat mixture.

Gastronoms

443 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms,
434 or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most
262 of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such
554 as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat,
461 salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434
435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

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435

TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

	Before October 1, 1946	After October 1, 1946	Percentage increase
Bread (black with rye)	0.9	3.2	255
Bread (whole wheat)	1.8	6.0	240
Meat tushonka	16.6	32.0	87
Pork in gravy	20.5	35.3	72
Meat and vegetables	10.0	15.3	53
Pork and rice	15.7	30.7	90
Meat and corn	10.0	17.7	77
Herrings in tomato sauce	11.5	25.0	117
Herrings in natural oil	17.2	37.5	118
Smoked cod	9.8	18.0	84
Lard	18.0	36.0	100

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

443 41.6 roubles a kilogram. Butter, which was almost never available,
435 in the ration stores at 24 roubles a kilogram, and in the public
262 markets, at 150. The price of sugar in the public markets was, on July 10, four to five times the ration store price.

443 In addition to these products for which there are comparable prices
262 in the ration stores, the public markets also offered certain foodstuffs
433 which were seldom or never available in the ration stores. In the public markets of Kiev dressed beef was selling for 70 roubles a kilogram on June 3, 1946, and 60 roubles on July 6; milk, which on June 3 brought 15 roubles a litre was selling for 12 to 14 roubles on July 6. The fall in the price of tomatoes illustrates the play of demand and supply; when the first fresh tomatoes arrived on the public markets, they brought 15 roubles for each small tomato; by the end of July the price had fallen to 3.5 or 4 roubles for large size tomatoes of the best quality. Similar price reductions occurred in other vegetables and fruits; in each case, however, prices were still extremely high; even when the crops had been harvested, the demand remained far greater than the supply.

The extent of the shortages may be gathered from a report by the UNRRA Mission in June 1946, when a tour of Kiev's two great public markets revealed only one pound of meat, several fowls, small quantities of milk and butter from nearby farms, fifteen small sausages being sold from one can, and a few miscellaneous titbits such as matches, cigarettes, and candy from a ten-in-one ration.

Present supplies are even more attenuated. Ration scales have been cut, and this naturally increases the demand for supplies in the public markets. As the demand grows and supplies dwindle, prices rise even higher. The next table compares free market prices in June 1946, July 1946, and January 1947.

TABLE XXVIII

Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	250.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 [434] For example, light workers were entitled to only 1,820 calories[1] a day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 433 461 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the war was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1946 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporozhie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 758 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter or lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all calorie rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Calorie Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 731 733 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed. The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 262 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

737 The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

434 Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their
262 pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations[1] plus the
745 special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. These amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office
262 workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

(It must be emphasized that the amounts given in the table are official scales, which, even though reduced, cannot regularly be met. Throughout, the figures in brackets refer to scarce items which are authorized, but cannot be supplied.)

TABLE XXIX

Ukrainian Ration Scales from October 1, 1946
(in kilograms per month)

Rationed commodity	Consumer category: Heavy worker	Light worker	Employee	Dependent	Children up to 14
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	nil	nil	nil	nil	(0.8)
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0 scarce
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[736] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

[1] [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 164 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

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731 Everything depends on this year's harvest (1947-48). Meanwhile, the next three or four months are expected to be the worst period since the famine of 1922. No people in Europe who suffered under German occupation and devastation will continue to suffer from hunger in 1947 as much as will the people of the Ukraine.